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ABSTRACT 
Military affairs as public activities and institutions are fundamentally connected 
to their geographical environment and landscape. While this close relationship 
has been a constant phenomenon in the cultural history of humán societies, its 
manifestations have been different in each historical era. Nevertheless, this process 
can best be described by the tightening relationship between geographical factors 
and military affairs. The significance of the impact of geographical relations on 
military activities was realized from the beginning, but the development of this 
understanding - from empiricism to modem academic military geographical 
thinking - has been a special process of cultural history. The way military decision-
making has considered geographical factors over time shows a tight correlation 
with the generál geographical literacy and the standing of geography as a science 
in a given era, as well as with how developed management theory was at the time. 
The present study describes the main steps and somé special features of the cultural 
history of this multifaceted development, which involves both management theory 
and strategic management. 
1. Military affairs and geography 
Military affairs as public activities are a basic feature of humán subsistence, 
according to the anthropogeography emerging around the early 20th century as 
a scientific field. According to Tibor Mendöl (1932), one of the prominent 
scholars of humán geography, humans are biological beings, and as such, they 
have basic needs: air, water, food, and shelter. The latter involves active defense 
against environmental factors as well as against other creatures, people and groups 
of people. One of the generál, fundamental theses of anthropogeography is that 
humans create tools to meet their subsistence needs, organize themselves into 
groups and societies, and in the meantime gradually conform to the landscape they 
live in. However, this conforming to the environment does not only mean obtaining 
air, water and food, but is alsó evident in the need for shelter. Throughout history 
and even at the early stages of the division of labor, in order to protect themselves 
from other groups, people have pursued special public activities and created an 
organization for this purpose, which is collectively known as military affairs. This 
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social organization and - at a certain stage of development - the profession itself 
conform to the geographic landscape just like the society that evolved to meet 
subsistence needs. At the same time, it alsó modifies the landscape while carrying 
out defense operations in order to ensure success. Thus, military affairs are somé 
of the most effective elements of anthropogenic factors involved in reshaping 
landscapes, something which can be noted all over the world. It is especially true 
for Europe, whose history has been shaped by armed conflicts transforming somé 
of its landscapes and regions. 
The above indicate that the geographical landscape and its relationships are 
closely tied to and interrelated with the defense mechanisms and institutions 
of a society as the landscape and the military affairs within it form a symbiotic 
relationship. This symbiosis is evident in the way military affairs and the military 
profession conform to the landscape while shaping it as well. People living in 
a landscape - even from the start of being organized into a society - utilize 
geographical factors to meet their defense needs, and the increasingly intensive use 
of these factors greatly contributes to the realization of their political goals (Nagy 
M. M. 2001). All this suggests that military personnel need to take geographical 
factors into consideration more seriously during political and military decision-
making, which, in turn, results in the geographical determination of military 
affairs. The consequence of this determination is that the historical development 
of armed conflicts and wars shows a strong correlation with the advance of 
geographical science and the generál geographical literacy of the public. As the 
geographical knowledge of a society evolves and public thinking increasingly 
involves geographical elements (Teleki P. 1996; Mendöl T. 1999), so does the 
consideration of geographical factors in a society's defense mechanisms (Nagy M. 
M. 2002, 2006). 
At this point we could ask if there has been a measurable difference over time 
between the geographical knowledge of society and the military profession. Nagy 
M. M. (2002) has already touched on this issue and concluded that the answer 
could only be dual in nature. In generál, during the course of history, a society's 
geographical literacy and attitűdé never diverges from those of its military. The 
alternative would be impossible as the soldiers comprising a society's defense 
organization are themselves members of the said society; therefore, their world-
view and generál knowledge level cannot be much different from that of their 
peers. This does not mean, however, that military personnel cannot have more 
extensive geographical knowledge than civilians. Military life has always involved 
a great deal of geographical mobility, one indicator of which is the fact that it 
was mainly soldiers who participated in the great geographical discoveries. This 
mobility requires greater knowledge of topography and terrain than an average 
person might have. At the same time, it alsó needs to be taken into consideration 
that military combat always takes place in a physical environment (earth, water, 
air, space), which creates a need for a thorough knowledge of it, at least to an extent 
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that would enable victory. All the above suggest that the geographical knowledge 
and approach of the military profession has been especially complex compared to 
those of the civilian society, but its geographical world view is still identical to that 
of society as a whole (Nagy M. M. 2006). 
The next question that needs to be discussed about the relationship between 
military affairs and geographical conditions is concemed with the utilization of 
geographical factors. The answer comes from the interpretation of the concept 
of war. The European cliché "war is the same as politics" - the continuation of 
politics by different means - clearly expresses the close ties between military 
affairs and politics. Still, this statement does not explain the concept of war. 
According to the synthesis of military science by Carl von Clausewitz, which is 
a foundation for modem systems of military theory and training, war means the 
use of force in order to impose our will on our opponents. Of course, Clausewitz 
does not rule out a close relationship between politics and military affairs; he 
even makes it the basis of his studies, but he still does not consider the two to 
be unequivocally equal, either. For him, wars are just a form of contact between 
nations and states, whose features overlap with politics before and during the war 
(Clausewitz, C. von 1961-1962; Perjés G. 1988). That is, war is an imposition of 
political will, although, - it needs to be emphasized - it does not necessarily have 
to be carried out by military force. The Clausewitz system of military theory was 
the one that enabled the realization and the application of the fact that conceming 
force there are two ways to impose political will. One of them is direct, immediate 
military force, while the other includes more indirect instruments (the threat of 
force, economic and psychological warfare, to mention just a few), which do not 
necessarily assume war conditions. On the contrary, most of the time these are most 
efifective during periods of peace. The execution of political will by applying such 
diverse forces just emphasizes the role of geographical conditions. The historically 
constant means of indirect warfare, such as those involving economics and natural 
resources, the obstruction of the opponent's transportation and trade by peaceful, 
often diplomatic measures, along with the application of pressure on the opponent 
through the possession of geographical regions can all prove effective only if the 
geographical factors are consciously utilized. This task does not exclusively fali 
on politicians, but on military personnel as well. It can be considered geographical 
acíivism, in which geographical factors are dedicated to and deliberately used for 
the imposition of political will or military force for political purposes (Nagy M. M. 
2001). History has proven it time and again that practicing geographical activism 
can determine the fate of peoples and nations in certain historical situations; in 
this sense, the geographical literacy of the soldiers and the geographical bases 
of military decisions, that is the apperception and acknowledgement of military 
affairs being determined by geography, may become a factor in the shaping of 
history. 
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2. Geographical factors and military decisions 
The Utilization of geographical activism has been apparent since the beginnings 
of military affairs, but it started to expand only in the early modem era, when the 
top military management started to make use of an important tool for summarizing 
geographical information, the map. According to Hans Delbrück, a renowned 
military histórián from the early 20lh century, military management started to use 
the first and, to the modem eye, quite rudimentary maps as early as the beginning 
of the 16lh century (Delbrück, H. 2003). From this moment on, the development 
of military affairs, cartography and geography have been closely intertwined 
(Delbrück, H. 2003; Klinghammer I. - Pápay Gy. - Török Zs. 1995). Let one fact 
of scientific history illustrate the tightness of this relationship. Geographical and 
military sciences were transforming at the beginning of the 19th century, both of 
them gaining their modem form at that time. In addition, the people who developed 
these into modem disciplines were living in the same era. The founder of modem 
geographical science, Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859) carried out his travels 
during the Napoleonic wars and in the following years, which enabled him to gain 
the knowledge for the establishment of modem geography and the publishing of 
his important works. Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) played a similar role in 
military science. He alsó gained valuable experience needed for the writing of his 
fundamental work during the Napoleonic wars. His main work, Vöm Kriege was 
published after his death, between 1932 and 1934, and an extended, multi-volume 
edition was alsó brought out in 1937. Humboldt's Kosmos was published between 
1845 and 1862. The tight, parallel development of military and geographical 
science is alsó evident in the fact that Clausewitz has alsó been considered a 
geographer - his above mentioned work, Vöm Kriege has alsó been regarded as a 
fundamental work of modem military geography (Tietze, W. 1968-1972). 
The 17th and 18th centuries are a unique era of military history as it is referred 
to as the period when permanent militaries developed. During these two 
centuries, military affairs and force were gradually becoming state monopolies, 
and the intuitional operations of earlier centuries were replaced by an increasing 
professionalism. Military forces attained their disciplined form in a relatively short 
time while military officers as a group developed into a qualified, professional 
social class. While luck and chance, which are the results of the inherent logic 
of military life and operations - as Clausewitz pointed out two hundred years 
ago - continued to impact military operations, their signifícance continued to 
decrease. The outcomes of armed conflicts became increasingly predictable, due 
partly to the deliberate utilization of geographical factors. The more extensive use 
of mostly military maps at the turn of the 18lh century allowed for geographic 
factors to consciously serve military purposes; thus, in somé cases the landscape 
itself became a protagonist in military events. At this point, the state and military 
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management were not thinking in terms of mere terrain anymore, but in terms of 
landscapes, regions, and countries (Angeli, M. et. al. 1876-1892; Perjés G. 1971). 
The method of military art of the 17th-18th centuries - which preferred maneuvering 
in the theater of war itself - in fact did nothing else but dedicate the raw factors of 
the landscape or the geographical forces of the area to military purposes. It actually 
happened in the case of the theater in the Carpathian Basin during the over 150 
years of Ottoman occupation and later during the Rákóczi rebellion (Nagy M. M. 
2009). This was the first time in universal military history that the focus shifted to 
the geographical element. Due to logistic and methodology problems of the military 
at the time, fortification gained increased significance universally. (Fortifícation, the 
predominance of maneuvering, and the overly disciplined nature of the emerging 
permanent military forces are phenomena of cultural history; they were inherent to 
the spirit and attitűdé of the baroque, late baroque and rococo eras.) 
Fortifícation involved a great amount of theory, mathematical calculations and 
knowledge of terrain and geography, and as such, it further enabled the professional 
approach to take root in the military. István Hajnal, a professor of history, aptly said 
the following about the leading military school and the French fortress architecture 
of the era: "... The art of fortification took clear mathematical-geometric shapes in 
the hands of Vauban, taking the terrain into account, every corner was designed to 
be free of enemy fire and to enable keeping the approaches under fire; the theory of 
blunt opposition vanished, the fortification seemed to have sunk into the ground: it 
was allpure logic, abstract science... " (own translation) (Hajnal I. 1936. 441. p.). 
This system was typical for the entire continent of Europe - and thus in Hungary, 
as well -, and it eventually spread all over the then known world. In the current 
Hungárián historical conscience - primarily due to somé very popular works of 
fíction - it comes down to a number of shabby, neglected and uncomfortable little 
fortifícations stopping the Ottoman advance. This popular belief, however, is not 
exactly true. In fact, there were somé small fortresses manned by a small number of 
soldiers, which protected the approaches of greater fortifícations, but the signifícant 
fortresses, such as those in Győr, Esztergom, Székesfehérvár, Szigetvár, Pápa and 
Eger, exhibit the signs of more deliberately planned fortifícations. This notion is 
verified by a number of identical maps discovered in Stockholm and Karlsruhe 
in the early 20th century depicting 17,h century fortifícations in the Carpathian 
Basin. These maps have recently been published by Kisari Balla György (2000) in 
facsimile edition - the originál ones had been drawn by hand - , and they include 
Hungárián fortifícations that had been remodeled according to Western designs. 
It is important to note that this task involved - in peace and wartime - the partial 
remodeling and continuous reconstruction of the fortifícation system along the 
inner rim of the Carpathian Mountains that was hastily established at the time 
of the Ottoman invasion. Along with the importance of the region's geographical 
conditions (Nagy M. M. 2007), these forts played a major role in stopping the 
Ottoman conquest in the middle of the Carpathian Basin, in conjunction with the 
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Turkish army's limited opportunities for maneuver in the area targeted for invasion 
- a feature of action radius theory (Perjés G. 1975). 
The Rákóczi rebellion can be considered a continuation of the era of Ottoman 
occupation in this sense. The country's leaders tied Hungary's fate to one of 
Europe's military conflicts, the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714): at 
the early stages of the rebellion, the fight against the Habsburg Empire, whose 
major military forces were engaged in Western Europe, did not seem at all 
hopeless (Markó Á. 1936). The Rákóczi rebellion is a perfect example for the way 
contemporary military forces could be crushed or at least weakened by the natural 
forces of the landscape due to provisioning problems - a phenomenon that was 
deliberately utilized by the Hungárián military management at the time. The nearly 
uninhabited area of the Great Plain of Hungary was avoided by all armies. When the 
Emperor's army had to cross the region in 1705, it had become quite disorganized 
and weakened on the way by the unfavorable geographical circumstances by the 
time it arrived to the Zsibó narrows in Transylvania, and it had to fight there in this 
condition with the Hungárián military forces. The fact that the Hungarians suffered 
a catastrophic defeat was due mainly to their lack of military expertise. Another 
universal lesson the Rákóczi rebellion taught us is that the expertise of well-
qualified military officers and their knowledge of geographical conditions have 
strategic significance (Nagy M. M. 2006, 2009). Modern research has confirmed 
what Prince Rákóczi Ferenc II himself alsó complained about, that the expertise 
of the contemporary Hungárián military officers greatly lagged behind that of 
the Habsburg Empire. Consequently, the upper levels of the Hungárián military 
and political leadership had not been able to recognize the excellent strategic 
opportunities that geography and military geography offered. The 1704 Hungárián 
military campaign against the Serbs demonstrates this situation perfectly: Rákóczi 
did not recognize the opportunity presented by his French allies marching towards 
Vienna along the Danube valley, so instead of leading his army to Vienna, the 
capital of the Empire, he lead an utterly meaningless military operation in the 
southem Great Plain. Thus, he missed the opportunity for ending the rebellion 
quickly and successfully (Nagy M. M. 2011). 
At the same time, this period of the emergence of permanent state militaries 
and mercantile state leadership is alsó characterized by the direct, measurable 
impact military affairs had on geography. From this time on, maps became 
permanent instruments of state and military leadership, which alsó illustrate Pál 
Teleki's notions (1996): in modern history, the geographical factor is gaining an 
increasingly important role in the thinking of society. In addition, the geographical 
approach of the military profession that was more subtle, detailed and deeper 
than that of the civilian society, along with other phenomena of military affairs, 
had a stimulating efifect on the development of geography. This case is illustrated 
by World War I. It is a well-known fact that this military conflict fundamentally 
changed the European way of thinking, and the science of geography was no 
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exception. In the years preceding the war, heated professional discussions were 
held within the discipline of geography on whether the focus of the discipline 
should be on physical or humán geography. According to Pál Teleki, it was the war 
that taught humanity the idleness of this dispute, and he believed that both of these 
factors have to be taken into consideration to the same extent in what he called 
synthesized geography (Teleki P. 1996). 
The other great period in the development of the issue considered in the present 
study is that from the late 19th and into the 20lh century. During these years two 
world wars took place and the Cold War began and all three events increased the 
signifícance of geographical factors in military politics and foreign policy. This 
is the result partly of processes of scientific history, and partly of experiences of 
everyday life. As for scientific history, through the work of the above-mentioned 
Carl von Clausewitz and his peer and counterpart Albrecht von Roon (1803-1879) 
the common field of military geography - alsó known as geography of defense -
within geography and military science was launched and institutionalized (Nagy 
M. M. 2006). While this field was still characterized by strong tendencies of 
descriptive geography and historicizing during World War I (Langhans, P. 1909), 
the war soon compelled a change in geographical thinking in both soldiers and 
politicians. Between the two world wars - learning from the mistakes of the first 
conflict - the political and military leaderships were no longer thinking merely 
in terms of the landscape and the geographical factors of direct physical force; 
instead a nuanced, deeply stratified geographical thinking was increasingly gaining 
ground. Consequently, the independent discipline of military geography, already 
accepted in geographical sciences, was becoming closer to political geography and 
identified with it, if only in its approach. This enabled Oskar von Niedermayer to 
write his modem military geography (1942), which can primarily be interpreted as 
the geography of the imposition of political will, even though the military aspect 
is too predominant in it for most modem readers. In fact, this type of military 
geography, close to political geography, manifested itself alsó in the fields of 
geopolitics and geostrategy, which had seceded from anthropogeography in this 
era. An emblematic figure of geopolitics and geostrategy was a soldier-geographer, 
Kari Haushofer (1869-1946), who alsó wrote an important work on military 
geography, in which he attempted to close the gap between the geographical 
thinking of the military profession and anthropogeography and politics (Haushofer, 
K. 1932; Nagy M. M. 2006). 
The primary military lesson of World War I is a quite simple one that can 
be discemed in Haushofer's and Niedermayer's works. Accordingly, the state 
leadership of each belligerent country had to face the fact that this war involved 
more than a fight between armed forces; it alsó involved the potentials of the 
opposing societies to a great degree. This practical realization shows similarities 
to the provision problems of 17-18"1 century warfare, as the carrying capacity of 
the theater of war was crucial at that time. Thus, it is not surprising that World War 
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I and the following decades resulted in increased attention by political and military 
leaders to geographical factors (Franké, A. 1934; Mundt, H. 1934; Schenke, W. 
1938). As for political and military decisions, Clausewitz's thesis on war and 
politics was unequivocally confírmed from a geographical aspect at this time. 
Translating this thesis into geography, in modern politics we utilize increasingly 
greater numbers of tools for the imposition of political will but they nearly all 
(economic, psychological, sociological, biological, etc. war and pressure) can be 
described by the methods of geography. The reason why civilian political and 
military decisions have become identical in modern geographical thinking is that 
both of them are dominated by the geographical factor. 
3. Conclusion 
As it has been described above, military affairs and geography have evolved in a 
necessarily symbiotic relationship since the beginning of humán history. As a result, 
the development of their approaches reached their milestones at the same time, while 
their geographical thinking were alsó becoming closer, only to finally intertwine at 
the highest levels of states in the 20lh century. Just as the geographical element has 
been gaining ground in European culture during the evolution of humán society, 
the connection between geographical approaches of military affairs and politics has 
accelerated and increasingly intensified. Thus, the imposition of will in intemational 
politics and the management processes and decisions applied to this end all require 
thorough geographical training and expertise from decision-makers. 
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